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RECENT DECISIONS 
BILLS AND Non;s-HoLDER IN DuE CounsE-NonCE OF lliFIRMITY IN 
INSTRUMENT 'I'O FINANCE CoMPANY CLOSELY CoNNEC'I'ED 'I'O DEALER-The 
defendant purchased a car from a dealer who represented it to be a new dem-
onstrator. In fact, the car was a used one. The defendant executed a negotiable 
note for the balance of the purchase price and a chattel mortgage on forms 
which were furnished the dealer by the plaintiff finance company. The dealer 
handled the paper, but the plaintiff was to finance the sale and the note was 
payable at the office of the plaintiff. Both the bill of sale and the chattel mort-
gage described the car as a new demonstrator. The note was indorsed in blank 
by the dealer and, along with the bill of sale and the chattel mortgage, was sent 
to the office of the finance company. Prior to the receipt of the certificate of 
title from the state, the finance company paid the dealer for the note. The title 
showed that the car was used and the defendant refused to pay further instal-
ments. On appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, held, reversed. The plaintiff 
did not qualify as a holder in due course because it had actual knowledge of 
the infirmities in the instrument.1 Since the plaintiff was not a holder in due 
course, it was bound by the same equities that existed between the defendant-
maker and the dealer-payee and could not recover on the negotiable note. 
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Daigle, (La. 1954) 72 S. (2d) 319. 
Financial credit arrangements play an important role in stimulating modem 
retail business, but in many instances the retailer cannot afford to assume the 
burden of a financier. Thus many retailers have understanding with finance 
companies whereby the latter provide the necessary blank forms and agree to 
purchase the note upon completion of the sale by the retailer. Assuming that 
1 Although the opinion is not entirely clear, it appears that the court found actual 
notice for two reasons: (1) the plaintiff financed the arrangement by which the dealer 
obtained possession of the car from the factory, and (2) the plaintiff held both the chattel 
mortgage and the title, which, when viewed together, demonstrated the misdescription of 
the car by the dealer. First, notice in the past which is forgotten at the time of the 
purchase of the instrument may not deprive the purchaser of the status of holder in due 
course. See BBI'IToN, BILLs AND Non;s §107 (1943). Second, the finance company paid 
for the note before the title arrived. The court said that a statute prevented the sale of the 
car from being complete until the title arrived. [La. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1950) §32:706.] 
The court reasoned that the transaction was not complete so that the finance company 
could not be a holder in due course until the title was in the hands of the company, and 
the title gave notice of the defects in the instrument. The statute requires the instrument 
to be "complete and regular upon its face" before the purchaser can claim to be a holder 
in due course. [Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law §52(1), enacted by La. Rev. Stat. 
(1950) §7:52(1).] It would seem that the court confused the requirement that the title 
arrive for the sale of the car to be complete with the requirement that the instrument be 
complete for the holder to qualify as a holder in due course. The sale of the car by the 
dealer should not affect the decision of whether the finance company purchased the note 
as a holder in due course. The sale of the car and the sale of the note are two separate 
transactions. See BBI'IToN, BILLS AND Non;s §113 (1943). 
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the note is negotiahle,2 the question arises whether the finance company can 
qualify as a holder in due course of the note.3 The holder having that status is 
not subject to the personal defenses which exist among the prior parties.4 How-
ever, to qualify for that advantageous position, the holder must take the instru-
ment in good faith without notice of any infirmities.5 It has been held that a 
finance company may receive the protection of a holder in due course despite 
its prior close relationship with the seller. 6 On the other hand, the modem 
tendency is to deny the finance company this favored status.7 The general 
attitude is that the "close connection" between the retailer and the finance 
company should prevent the latter from receiving any special protection, and 
such a decision frequently is justified by finding actual or constructive notice 
of the defect.8 In the past, Louisiana expressly rejected the argument that the 
close connection is sufficient to defeat the presumption that the purchaser of 
the instrument was a holder in due course,9 hut the principal case takes a step 
in the direction of the modem trend despite its affirmation of the earlier deci-
sion.10 The principal case may he explained on traditional grounds since 
actual knowledge of infirmities, of course, precludes one from becoming a holder 
in due course.11 But the attitude is a warning to finance companies closely 
2 A question of negotiability may arise. See State National Bank of EI Paso, Texas 
v. Cantrell, 47 N.M. 389, 143 P. (2d) 592 (1943); Von Nordheim v. Cornelius, 129 
Neb. 719, 262 N.W. 832 (1935). For other problems which may arise, see 152 A.L.R. 
1222 (1944). 
3 For a collection of cases see 128 A.L.R. 729 (1940). 
4Nll, §57 [enacted by La. Rev. Stat. (1950) §7:57]. See also BRITrON, BILLS AND 
NoTEs §125 (1943). 
5 "A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the follow-
ing conditions: •.. (3) That he took it in good faith and for value; (4) That at the 
time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect 
in the title of the person negotiating it." NIL §52. See also 8 AM.. JOB., Bills and Notes 
§§383, 386, 400 (1937); 10 C.J.S., Bills and Notes §§321, 323, 330(d) (1938); BRITroN, 
BILLS .AND NoTEs §§100, 101, 108 (1943). 
6 White System of New Orleans, Inc. v. Hall, 219 La. 440, 53 S. (2d) 227 (1951). 
See also International Finance Co. v. Magilansky, 105 Pa. Super. 309, 161 A. 613 (1932); 
Mayer v. American Finance Corp., 172 Okla. 419, 45 P. (2d) 497 (1935). 
7 lliustrative of the cases are Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Machine 
Works, 34 Cal. (2d) 766, 214 P. (2d) 819 (1950); Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, (Fla. 
1953) 63 S. (2d) 649; Wilson v. Gorden, (D.C. Mun. App. 1952) 91 A. (2d) 329; 
Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W. (2d) 260 (1940). For addi-
tional cases see 128 A.L.R. 729 (1940). 
s See cases cited in note 7 supra. The courts feel that the finance company should not 
be able to use the NIL as a shield to obtain an unfair advantage over the maker of the 
note. 
9 White System of New Orleans, Inc. v. Hall, note 6 supra. The principal case cites 
this decision with approval, but holds that the finance company had actual notice and 
could not qualify as a holder in due course. Note the presumption created in favor of the 
holder by NIL §59. See also BRITroN, B1LLs AND NoTEs §102 (1943). 
10 See cases cited in note 7 supra, where the decision is often justified by finding 
actual or constructive notice. See also Taylor v. Atlas Security Co., 213 Mo. App. 282, 
249 s.w. 746 (1923). 
11 See note 5 supra. 
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related to retailers that the courts will scrutinize their financial transactions and 
will not hesitate to protect the purchaser from unscrupulous dealers through 
finding actual notice of the defect at the slightest provocation.12 How much 
further the law reasonably should be extended to include cases where no such 
actual notice exists in fact is a problem of public policy. The innocent pur-
chaser's grievance is justifiable where the finance company is closely connected 
to the wrongdoing dealer,13 but the policy of encouragement of credit sales to 
further the national prosperity calls for assurances in favor of financing agen-
cies.14 In view of the above conflicting policy considerations, the problem 
should be left to the legislatures for comprehensive and definitive treatment 15 
Meanwhile, the courts should not go beyond the provisions of the statutes in 
an attempt to protect the purchaser. He has a remedy against the dealer to the 
same extent as the cash buyer. The negotiability of his promissory note should 
not be sacrificed by subjecting the purchaser to the personal defenses between 
the original parties unless actual notice of the infirmity in the instrument clearly 
is present16 
William G. Cloon, Jr., S.Ed. 
12 As to the existence of actual notice in the principal case, see note 1 supra. 
13 Note the strong language used in favor of protecting the purchaser in Buffalo In-
dustrial Bank v. De Marzio, 162 Misc. 742, 296 N.Y.S. 783 (1937), revd. on other 
grounds, 6 N.Y.S. (2d) 568 (1937). 
14 On the importance of the finance company to the economic development of the 
nation, see Grimes, "Distribution and the Finance Company," 18 HARv. Bus. RBv. 199 
(1940). 
15 Some statutes limit the rights of the finance companies. See ill. Rev. Stat. (1953) 
c. 95, §26; Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1951) art. 83, §134; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 
1954) tit. 69, §615G. Also note the definition of "seller" in Uniform Conditional Sales 
Act §1. For the treatment under the Uniform Commercial Code, see 57 YALE L.J. 1414 
(1948). 
16 The purchaser should not be required to search for additional facts which reason-
able inquiry might disclose. Commercial paper, like money, must remain liquid to facilitate 
its exchange. See BlllTl'oN, BILLS AND NoTBS §112 (1943). 
